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When asked last week by Alexandra Kemmerer and Maximilan Steinbeis to submit
a comment on nudging, I accepted at short notice. My small contributing message
to this debate is that nudging plays an important role in aid politics. Substantially,
there are parallel debates going on, and you might find some of the insights useful
by means of transferral. As this is a new and explorative debate, there might still be
space for some inspiration from related fields. Principally, I am supporting Emanuel
Towfigh’s and Christian Traxler’s blog entry with a too highly specific international
perspective. I make this point because I worked for German aid until last year, and
am now engaging in reflections of aid policies in research. For the same reason,
though, I am also professionally detached from the identity of a German lawyer, and
from this follows a limited capacity to anticipate how well this matches the habitus of
this blog. I thought it worthwhile to override this insecurity. Let me explain why:
If you care less about nudging as a new label for a concept, and focus more on its
substance, you will see it flourishing all around development aid. To little surprise:
Aid flow architectures operate in a largely unregulated environment, and require
incentivising actions and results across physically vast distances (humans are simply
more likely to understand what is really going on in their direct physical proximity
than thousands of miles away). With thus limited hard power resources (except for
distributing financial recourses), it is especially necessary to know how you can
effectively influence human behaviour.
To quickly illustrate what I mean by referring to aid as an un-regulated
environment: In Germany, the Parliament exercises control over its official
development aid mainly through the budget – every law student’s prime example
of a German statute only in form but with no material conditions (“formelles,
aber nicht materielles Gesetz”). Welfare does not require legal regulation in
Germany (“Unterschied von Leistungs- zur Eingriffsverwaltung auf Basis des
Sozialstaatsprinzips”), although in policy practice it generally is (e.g., Hartz IV
regulating social aid within Germany, esp. in case of unemployment). This is not
unproblematic given that aid is not only about goodwill, but essentially means
spending taxpayer money through a large bureaucracy targeting individuals in
developing countries. As a consequence, the latter are generally seen as mere
beneficiaries, i.e. objects of aid, and less as legal subjects with individual freedoms
to invoke. The German Government reported an estimated expenditure of EUR 12,2
billion in 2014 as Official Development Aid (ODA) to the OECD: Compared to other
policy fields this certainly does not indicate priority, but still, Germany continues to be
the third largest donor worldwide.
Nudging as a means of influencing human behaviour directly correlates with public
choice theories. In this line, the World Bank launched its World Development
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Report 2015 last December on “Mind, Society, and Behavior”, an elegant and well-
researched policy document exploring this thematic area. In order to incentivise
change for the good, it is important to have a broader understanding of human
behaviour, including irrational aspects, which play an over-arching role in poor, often
uneducated contexts. It is especially insightful for mental models as interpretive
frames.
First, I hold that nudging should not be seen as a specific political strategy you can
adopt or reject. If this is about influencing human behaviour, it will simply happen
– like it or not — if not consciously, then subconsciously. And in my opinion, the
latter is worse. In this matter, I actually doubt that Germany is on the move towards
behaviourally informed policy making. They are already doing it! Be more self-critical,
please: Germany should strive to better understand current policy making practices.
Second, nudging relates to the engine room of politics challenging the clean reflexive
distance of legal theory. In the international arena, the valuable function of this
reflexive distance (namely, being able to cool down heated political debates) has
just been reinforced by Jochen v. Bernstorff (“International Legal Scholarship as a
Cooling Medium in International Law and Politics”, European Journal of International
Law (EJIL) 2014, pp.977-990). At the same time, and in an over-simplification,
natural sciences can single out issue areas to explain causes and effects, but only
humanities can reconstruct and tell us something about whole social systems –
very much including legal theory on regulation. In a constructivist AND independent
fashion, we have to respond to pressing global problems. Global idealism can be
surprisingly realistic in a “there-is-simply-no-alternative” fashion when you think
of Dag Hammarskjöld’s dictum that “the UN was not created to take mankind to
heaven, but to save humanity from hell”. While we know quite a lot about what we
need to do in order to make the world a better place, we know surprisingly little
about how to do it. Call me a silly dreamer, but I believe that research plays a social
function, and that the researcher carries a mental frame just like everyone else. This
means that we have to concern ourselves with phenomena like nudging – while
upholding independence concerning specific results.
Third, a loose add-on: Political theory at the other side of the spectrum actually is
concerned with similar questions. In 2014, Rainer Forst published an online article in
the Journal of Political Philosophy on noumenal power based on an earlier Frankfurt
working paper. Again, I hold that this is yet another label for a similar concept
mirroring the curiosity to conceptualize what intrinsically motivates human behaviour,
in contrast to extrinsic forms of power such as physical violence. Cognitive power
is defined here as the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do something that B
would otherwise not have thought or done. So, this is a fascinating debate, even if
you dislike variations of public choice theories because they lack intellectual depth
for being too concentrated on certain phenomenologies.
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